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Investment, Openness and Country Risk
ABSTRACT
Thepurpose of this study is to draw attention to the linkages between country
risk and the openness of an economy, and to demonstrate that in the long run
the openness of an economy is endogenously determined by the interaction
between endowments and policies. The presence of country risk poses a
problem for the smooth operation of international credit markets: the ex—ante
first best policy is for countries to pre-commit themselves to no-default
policies. Such a commitment, however, may not be credible because it may not
be the optimal ex—post policy. This suggests a special role for policies leading
towards investment in openness -asa way to increase the credibility of a no-
default commitment. The paper studies the optimal implementation of these
policies. Our analysis demonstrates that a rise in country risk is associated
with more frequent defaults and consequently with a lower level of
investment. The resultant drop in investment is larger in activities with
greater reliance on international trade. The presence of country risk is shown
to introduce a distortion, calling for financial policies in the form of a tax on
consumption borrowing and a different tax on investment borrowing. The
optimal investment borrowing tax balances two effects: the aggregate
indebtedness and the openness effects. The stronger the openness effect, the
lower the optimal investment borrowing tax; and if this effect dominates, the
optimal policy is in the form of an investment subsidy. A final topic of our
analysis is a study of the nature of country risk in the presence of equity
finance. We demonstrate that swapping nominal debt with equities may have
useful consequences for reducing country risk, but it cannot eliminate the







The evolution of external indebtedness during the 1970's and the
1980's has demonstrated the unique dimension of international banking in
the presence of country risk. The lack of simple enforcement mechanisms
for debt repayment tends to degenerate the international credit market
into an equilibrium where the volume of international credit is limited
by the effective penalties associated with defaults. These penalties
are the results of potential embargoes, being associated with
restrictions on the flow of both temporal and intertemporal trade (i.e.,
trade in goods and financial assets, respectively).
We can gain further insight into this issue by noting that the
borrower's 'first best' policy (i.e., the policy that will maximize the
expected welfare of the borrowing nation) is to pre-commit itself to
no—default. This is because a default is associated with a net waste of
resources (resulting from the embargo) that is not captured by any party
and thus results in welfare losses. The problem with a no—default
commitment is that it is not a credible one, because it is time
inconsistent. The time consistent policy regarding the default decision
is based on a periodic cost—benefit assessment. Indeed, the existing
literature has focused on analyzing the properties of the time
consistent equilibrium. Typically, the default decision is arrived by
comparing the saving resulting from the default to the default penalty,
which is taken as exogenously given. 1/
1/ For an analysis of country risk see, for example, Harberger
(1976), Kharas (1981), Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Sachs (198L1), Kletzer
(19814), Krugman (1985), Smith and Cuddington (1985), Edwards (1985),
Folkerts—Landau (1985), Dooley (1986), Aizenman (1986), Bulow and Rogoff
(1986), Aizennian (1987), and Helpman (1987).—2—
Thepurpose of the present paper is to focus on the role of
investment policies in the presence of country risk. The importance of
thisissue stems from the observation that a trade embargo has the
consequence of eliminating the gains from trade. Thus, a default
penaltyis tied directly to the openness of the economy. In the long
run the openness of an economy is endogenously determined by the
interactionbetween the endowment andinvestment policies. These
policies, in turn, may have important effects on the supply of credit
facing the economy. A focus of our analysis is to examine the linkages
between investment policies and country risk.
As is common in the time consistency literature, there are welfare
benefits associated with a credible commitment that will allow the
attainment of the first best equilibrium. 1/ We can move towards such
an equilibrium by designing investment policies that will increase the
openness of the economy, thereby raising the costs of deviations from a
no—default commitment. 2/ In order to examine these policies we will
construct a simple two—periodsanalysis of country risk. Borrowing in
periodone is used to finance consumption and investment in the various
activities. These activities differ in their exposure to international
trade, due to varying degrees of reliance on imported inputs or on
external markets for sales of output. The country will default in
period two if the default penalty falls short of the debt. The
1/ For an analysis of time consistency see Calvo (1978) and Kydland
andPrescott(1977).
2/Investment in openness may serve as a credible commitment as long
asinstalled capital is sector specific.—3—
internationalcredit market is dominated by risk neutral lenders that
will supply sufficient credit to equate the expected yield on their
international lendings to the exogenously given risk free interest
rate. Domestic agents are small enough to be price takers in the
domestic credit market, thus allowing them to treat the interest rate
facing them as exogenously given. The default decision against external
creditors is made by a centralized decision maker, like the central
bank, whose policy is guided by an attempt to maximize the expected
welfare of a representative consumer. Thus, the source of country risk
is transfer risk. Agents are assumed to be rational and to be fully
informed regarding the default decision rule guiding the central bank.
We study the factors determining the supply of credit facing the
economy, the private sector consumption and investment, and the policies
needed to attain the optimal allocation.
Our analysis demonstrates that the supply of credit is determined
by the aggregate borrowing and by its decomposition among consumption
and the various investment activities. The supply is upward sloping and
may include a backward bending portion. The investment in a given
sector is determined by the expected incidence of country default and by
the relative exposure of the sector to international trade. A rise in
country risk is associated with more frequent defaults and consequently
with a lower level of investment. The resultant drop in investment is
larger in activities with greater reliance on international trade.
The importance of financial policies in the presence of country
risk stems from the observation that competitive equilibrium is
inefficient in the presence of international debt. The presence of—II—
country risk is shown to introduce a distortion. The distortion arises
from the fact that individual borrowers treat the rate of interest as
given even though from the perspective of the country as a whole the
rate of interest changes with the volume of borrowing and investment
because of the change in the probability of default. Each small
consumer overlooks the change in the probability of default induced by
his marginal borrowing and marginal investment. The change in the
probability of default creates an externality because of the consequent
changein the expected default penalty inflicted on all domestic
consumers.
The presence of countryrisk calls forfinancial policies. These
policiesare in the form of a tax on consumption borrowing and a
different tax on investmentborrowing. The tax internalizesthe effect
ofthe activity financed by the borrowing on the probability of
default. The optimal tax should be higher the greater the increase in
the probability of default resultant from that activity. For example,
investment in intermediate goods that must be exported for final
assembly will tend to be associated with a lower optimal borrowing tax
relative to an investment in the production of final goods. Similarly,
investment in export substitutes or non—traded goods will tend to be
more taxed than investment in exportable goods. This outcome is
consistent with the notion that in the presence of country risk a
country will be able more easily to finance export led growth that is
biased towards the production of intermediate goods rather than final
goods, or inward growth biased towards import substitution.—5—
Unlike the case of a consumption borrowing, the investment
borrowing affects the borrowing externality in two opposing directions.
First, the marginal borrowing raises the total indebtedness, thus
increasing the probability of default. Second, the investment in the
traded sector also raises the openness and the productive capacity of
the economy, thereby changing the default penalty and the probability of
default. The optimal investment borrowing tax balances these two
effects. The stronger the openness effect, the lower the optimal
investment borrowing tax; and if this effect dominates, the optimal
policy is in the form of an investment subsidy. Consequently, in the
presence of country risk the marginal use of funds plays a key role in
determining the appropriate policies.
A final topic of our analysis is a study of the nature of country
risk in the presence of equity finance. We demonstrate that swapping
nominal debt with equities may have useful consequences for reducing
country risk, but it cannot eliminate the fundamental problems
associated with international credit. If the random shocks affect
output and the default penalty in the same way we obtain the strong
result that equity finance will eliminate defaults up to the credit
ceiling. This is done by correlating the repayments with the default
penalty. The debt—equity swap, however, is not able to eliminate the
resulting need to impose a ceiling on the available credit. Instead, it
may allow us to increase the credit ceiling. These results should be
viewedas a special case of a more general economic environment: in the
presence of several shocks which affect output and the defaultpenalty—6—
indifferent ways, the move to equity finance may be beneficial, but it
will not eliminate defaults.
II. The Credit Market Equilibrium
Let us construct a simple framework for the analysis of country
risk and investment policy in the presence or default risk. This can be
done in a two—periods, multi-sectorial economy. Suppose that the value
added in sector i depends on three factors. First, on the realization
of a productivity shock. Second, it may be affected by the decision
regarding default. For example, if default raises the costs of imported
inputs it will tend to depress output. Third, the value added in sector
i depends positively on the capital stock, which in turn is determined
by past investment. We can summarize the value added in sector i at
time t by:
n, Kit)if no default occurs
(1) Y.=it11;t'd, Kit)if default occurs
where 'P is the state of nature, reflecting a productivity shock
(LIaw >0). The second term stands for the default position of the
economy. It can have values of n and d, for default and no-default
position, and KIt is the stock of capital in sector i at time t. For
expositional simplicity we assume that the economy is a price taker in
the international market, and we normalize all prices of final goods to
unity. We also assume a common productivity shock for all sectors, and—7--
weassume that the density function of the productivity shock (denoted
byf('1O) is common knowledge. The GNP in our economyisthe sum of the
value added in all activities, being given
q
by Yt(W; s) = Y. s, K. where s =nor d (no default or
i=1
1, 1,
default, respectively) and there are q sectors. 1/
We define the default penalty (denoted by ) as the drop in the
GNP resultant from the default: =Y('!';
n) — d).Let us
assume that the default penalty is larger in goods states of nature
(i.e. B L IB'P > 0). 2/
Aggregate indebtedness in the second period (t2) is denoted by
B, and the interest rate on that indebtedness is r*.Aggregate
borrowing is the result of consumption borrowing (denoted by B0) and
investment borrowing in sector i (denoted by I, where 1 iq). For
simplicity of exposition we assume that all the investment in period one
q
is financed via external borrowing. In such a case B =B0
+
i=1
and assuming no depreciation we obtain that K12 =K11
+I.,.3/
The default decision in period two can be summarized by the f ollow—
ing simple rule: default if the penalty falls short of the payment due:
no default if B (1 + r*) (
defaultif B (1 +r*)>
1/ Note that the GNP is a function also of the vector of capital
(Ki,t,... K2t,..., Kq,t). For notational simplicity this vector is
suppressed.
2/ This assumption reflects the presumption that in goods states of
nature we expect greater volume of international trade, thereby raising
the default penalty.
3/ To simplify we neglect the potential role of initial indebtedness
by assuming it to be zero. For an analysis regarding a partial default
decision in period zero due to initial indebtedness see Kru.man (1985).—8—
Letus denote by 'Y0 the marginal value of the productivity shock
being associated with default (i.e., ''isdefined by the requirement
that B(1+ r*)=A).Consequently, the probability of no default is the
probability that the productivity shock exceeds 'PQ.Let us denote this
probability by TI. 1/Assuming that the international banking sector
isdominatedby risk neutral agents we can characterize the supply of
creditby the combination of B and r* that solves:
(2)1 +rf
=(1+r*)fi
where r is the exogenouslygiven risk free interestrate. 2/ We can
summarize the supply of credit facing the economy by curve SS in Figure
1. The supply schedule is upward sloping for intermediate levels of
credit. It may include also a backward bending portion, reflecting the
fact that a rise in the interest rate has two opposing effects on
expected returns -—fora given probability of no default it increases
the expected yield, but at the same time it reduces the probability of
payment,depressing the expected yield. If the second effect dominates,
we will operate on the backward bending portion of the supply
schedule. Direct application of (2) reveals that the elasticity of the
supply of credit Cd log (1 ÷r*)/d log B) is determined by the
elasticity of the probability of no default with respect to the interest
1/ Formally, II = f('F)d 11.
— 0
2/The probability of no default is a function of the following
variablesTI =IT(,r*; where the signs above the variables stand
for the sign of the partial derivatives, and 2 stands for the vector of







rate,denoted by —c (i.e., c =— dlog 11/ d log (1 +r*)). It can be
shown that d log (1 +r*)/d log B =c/Cl—c).1/ The term c is a
measure of the segmentation of the domestic credit market from the
international market, being determined by the nature of the distribution
of the default penalty. A lower c is associated with greater capital
market integration, and c =0corresponds to the case where country
risk is absent. We restrict the economy to operate along the upward
sloping portion of the supply of credit schedule (where a rise in
indebtedness is associated with a rise in the interest rate). 2/
We would like to use our framework to evaluate optimal policies in
the presence of country risk. We can accomplish this by comparing the
optimality conditions determining the consumption and investment from
the point of view of the consumer and the centralized planner. A
comparison between the planner's and the consumer's solutions reveals
that the two differ in that the planner applies the social interest
rate, whereas the consumer applies the private one (see the Appendix for
the derivations of these results). The social interest rate is defined
as the totalmarginal interestcost associated with the borrowing for
consumption and for investment in activity i, given by
I'Thus,we operate on the upwards sloping portion of the supply of
credit as long as c < 1, and we reach the credit ceiling where c =1.
for further details on the factors determining the supply of credit in
the presence of country risk see Aizenman (1986).
2/ This assumption is consistent with welfare maximization: it can be
shown that an equilibrium on the backward bending portion of the supply
of credit schedule is inefficient. Ruling out such an equilibrium may
require policies in the form of optimal borrowing taxes (see Aizenman
(1986)).— 10—
(1+r*)(1+dlog(i -i-r*) (1 +r*)(1+dlog(i +r*))•= 1,...,q
respectively. Note that the social planner may face different social
interestrates for the various activities. The key difference between
the individual agent and the social planner is that the latter is
internalizing the marginal changes in the interest rate facing the
economy due to marginal borrowing. These changes in turn are determined
by the use of these funds, and are reflected in the second term in the
social interest rates. The percentage difference between the private
and the social interest rate equals the elasticity of the interest
rate (1 +r*)with respect to the borrowing. Logarithmic derivation of
(2) gives us that the elasticity with respect to consumption borrowing
isd log (1 +r*)= >0. This elasticity equals the elasticity
of the supply of credit weighted by the relative importance of the
consumption borrowing to the entire volume of borrowing. Applying a
similar derivation we can infer that the elasticity with respect to
I. I. A.
• .dlog(1+r*) Ci1 i investmentborrowing is:
d log I
= -
whereA. is the elasticity of the probability of no default with respect
to the stock of capital in sector I (i.e.,A. =3 log 11/ 3 log K1). We
can view A. as a measure of the openness associated with the investment
in sector 1.An investment project raising the openness will have the
consequence of increasing the probability of no default, thereby
raising A1.Consequently, the magnitude of Ai is a measure of the
importance of this effect. We will further investigate this
interpretation in Section III.
The difference between the interest rate of the private consumer
and the social planner implies that in the absence of policies the— 11—
presenceof country risk implies a distortion. From the social point of
view the equilibrium is associated with "excessive" borrowing for
consumption because the private interest rate falls short of the social
one. This situation provides the rationale for policies. The
distortion arises frcn the fact that individual borrowers treat the rate
of Interest as given even though frcntheperspective of the country as
a whole the rate of interest rises with the volume of consumption
borrowing due to the rise in the probability of default. Each small
consumer overlooks the marginal rise in the probability of default
induced by his marginal borrowing. The rise in the probability of
default entails a negative externality because of the consequent rise in
the expected default penalty inflicted on all domestic consumers.
Therefore, the role of policies is to Internalize this externality. An
optimal consumption borrowing tax (denoted by is needed to yield
equality between the social and private Interest rates. This tax is
defined by the condition that 1+r0 =(1+r*)(1+dlog (1+r*))where
is the danestic interest rate defined by the borrowing tax (i.e.,
1 +rc=
1+ r* (1 +p)).Applying our previous results yields the
optimal tax to be
Pc = 1;:*
> o. .3_I
1/Note that as c approaches one the optimal tax approaches infinity,
corresponding to an effective quota on external borrowing implemented by
the central bank. This quota has the consequence of ruling out
inefficientequilibrium on the backward bending portion of the supply of
credit. For more details see Aizenman (1986).— 12—
Byfollowing a similar approach we can determine that the optimal
borrowing tax for investment in sector i (denoted by p1) is
-c'i 1+r*A. I1+r*
/ p1
-B r 1—s K. r *
1
Notice that unlike the case of a consumption borrowing, marginal
investment borrowing affects the borrowing externality in two opposing
directions. First, the marginal borrowing raises the total
indebtedness, thus Increasing the probability of default. This effect
is captured by the first term in (14), and is similar to the one reported
in (3)forconsumption borrowing. Second, the investment in the traded
sector also raises the openness andtheproductive capacity of the
economy, thereby increasing the default penalty and reducing the
probability of default. This effect is captured in the second term, and
is proportional to the measure of the investment in openness, A1. The
optimal borrowing tax balances these two effects. The stronger the
investment effect, the lower the optimal investment borrowing tax.
The optimal taxes have a simple diagrammatic interpretation in
terms of Figure 2. Let MC stand for the social marginal costs of
consumption borrowing. The consumption borrowing tax is defined by the
vertical distance between the supply SS and the marginal cost. Note
that the location of the supply schedule is determined by the vector of
the capital stock in the economy (denoted by it).Borrowingfor
+ +
investmentpurposes has the consequence of raising K to K', thereby
shiftingthe supply arid the corresponding marginal cost schedules to•1
k— 13—
SS'and MC', respectively. The optimal investment borrowing tax is
defined by the vertical distance between SS' and the new marginal cost
schedule. 1/
A relevant Implication of country risk is that the marginal use of
funds plays a key role in determining the appropriate policies because
the role of policies is to internalize the marginal contribution of the
activity to the probability of default. if one activity raises this
probability by more than another, borrowing f or that activity should be
taxed at a higher rate. This is the rationale for the differential
taxation of borrowing for consumption versus the various investment
projects. A possible consequence of our analysis is that investment in
openness should be treated favorably relative to investment that does
not affect openness or borrowing for consumption. For example,
investment in intermediate goods that must be exported for final
a3semblymay be associated with a different contribution towards country
risk thaninvestment in the production of a final good. Consequently,
thesocial interest rateand thecorrespondingborrowing tax/subsidy
rates will differ across these activities. To derive this result more
formally we should impose further structure on our model. This is done
in the next section by specializing the model to deal with an economy
where a default results In a rise in the price of imported inputs, and
1/ Note that if the investment financed by the borrowing is highly
effective in raising the default penalty, the shift to the right of the
relevant schedule may result in a policy of subsidizing that investment
relative to the Initial no policy equilibrium. This will correspond to
the case where the MC' schedule is to the right of the original SS.— 114—
wherethe various sectors differ in their dependency on importable
goods. 1/
III. Investment and Imported Inputs
We would like to construct the simplest example to deal with
country risk with endogenous choice of openness. This can be done in a
two sectorial economy. The two sectors differ in terms of their
relianceon international trade .Forexample, consider an economy
where output in sector i(denoted by X1) is produced by the following
process:
(5) X. = C. (K.)a (M.)i
1 1 1 1
where K and are the capital and the imported inputs used in sector i,
and C is a constant. The only difference between the two sectors is
that they differ in their dependence on international trade. One of
them, suppose sector 1, is more dependent on international trade
(i.e.< ).Thus,we can refer to as a measure of the "openness",
orthe reliance on international trade of activity i.In the short run
the stock of capital is exogenously given. We denote the price of the
imported input by m' and we assume thatis determined by the policies
1/ An example of such an economic environment may be the case of
Turkey in the 1970's, whereasa consequence of credit difficulties
Imports of energy were adversely affected. Our discussion should be
viewed as only one example f or modeling external dependency. While the
focus of the analysis here is on the inputs linkages, similar analysis
can apply for output linkages, where various sectors differ in the share
of exports.— 15—
ofthe country. In the absence of default the country faces the
international price of m' assumed to be unity. A default will have the
consequence of triggering a penalty due to a trade embargo. A simple way
to capture the penalty is by assuming that it will raise the price of
imported inputs by a factor of p > 0, such that in states of default the
effective costs of importables facing the country is exp
Producers in each sector maximize profits in two ways. In the
first period producers will choose the optimal investment which will
determine the capital stock in the second period. Within each period
the stock of capital is given, and producers will choose the imported
input M in order to maximize profits. As is shown in the Appendix, the
default penalty can be approximated by the sum of output in the various
sectors in states of no default weighted by a measure of the reliance on
trade (the 8. 's) times the increase in imported inputs prices, m•
Formally, the default penalty can be approximated for small values of
by:






for I =1,2(c. are constants).
The reliance on international trade (as measured by the importance
of the imported input, 8) plays a key role in determining the relative
importance of sector I in the aggregate default penalty. A sector that
Is shielded from international trade would not play a role in the
determination of the aggregate default penalty. These observations play
a key role in determining the optimal tax on borrowing for investment In16 —
sectori. An investment in activity with a larger "openness" index
.willcause a greater increase in the the default penalty, causing a
larger increase in the probability of no default. Thus, we expect
sectors with larger exposure to trade to be associated with a larger
elasticity of the probability of no default with respect to capital
(denoted by A1). Let us recall that this A1 was referred to as a measure
of the openness associated with investment in sector i. A larger A. was
shown to be associated with a smaller investment borrowing tax (see
(a)).Applying(6) we show in the Appendix that the value of
equals s1ccz/(1 —), where5jisa measure of sector i's share in
the aggregate penalty. This measure is proportional to the reliance on
imports,3..Consequently, we can derive the reduced form of the optimal
investmentborrowing tax for activity i:
!(i-1)K1
](1+
Theoptimal tax depends negatively on the openness of activity i to
international trade. A smaller openness is associated with smaller
valuesof s and .,implyinga higher investment borrowing tax. An
activity with no contribution to the default penalty (= s=0)
should be treated similarly to a borrowing for consumption. 1/
1/ Note that (4') also implies that the condition for subsidizing
investment in sector i is that K/B < s a/Cl —). Thus,a higher
aggregate indebtedness as well as a higher reliance of activity i on
international trade will increase the likelihood of subsidizing
investment in sector i.— 17
Adefault is associated with a penalty that results in a lower
productivity of capital. To gain further insight regarding the adverse
consequences of country risk on investment it is useful to consider a
special case. Suppose that investment is conducted by risk neutral
agentswho equate the expected cost of capital to the expected marginal
product, and let usassumethat the logarithm of the productivity shock
isnormally distributed (log ('i')N (O,V)) with mean zero and a small
variance V. In the Appendix we demonstrate that in a competitive




where d is a constant. Equation (7) has a simple interpretation: the
stock of capital depends positively on the term in the bracket, which is
the ratio of expected net productivity (net of the default penalty)
over the expected cost of capital. 1/ The expected cost of credit is
the risk free interest rate, and this is the cost element in that
equation. Thus, as long as we operate below the credit ceiling,
country risk does not change the expected cost of borrowing (being equal
1/ Note that 1 —IIis the probability of default, and —
isthe percentage drop in output and in the productivity of capital
attributed to default. Consequently, im1 —11)1(1-) hasthe
interpretation of the expected drop In output and in the productivity of
capital due to default (see (6)).- 18—
tothe risk free rate). Instead, country risk operates by reducing the
expected marginal product of capital, thereby reducing investment.
It is noteworthy that the adverse consequences of country risk
affect the various sectors differentially. Investment drops more in the
sectors that are more heavily dependent on international trade.
Formally, one can show that a marginal increase in the probability of
default will reduce investment in sector I by a factor of1 — in
1
proportionto the relative openness of sector 1. 1/
Ill.Debt Versus Equity Finance
Recently we have observed the emergence of schemes intended to swap
existing debt with equities. A typical loan in the 1970's and 1980's
has been in the form of a nominal interest rate contract, not allowing
for contingencies. It is hard to believe that such a contract is
optimal, and a purpose of the debt—equity swap is to overcome some of
the difficulties associated with loans with limited price contingencies
by replacing a non—contingent with a contingent contract. 2/ Indeed, it
is somewhat of a puzzle as to why the growing awareness of the welfare
benefits of contingencies has occurred only recently. 3/ We turn now to
1/ Formally, d log K1/d(1 —II)
—1P/(1
— —
2/One standard argument for debt contracts is the costs of
monitoring the behavior of the borrower and other informational costs.
Thisargument cannot, however, explain the lack of contingencies that
use public information which is exogenous to the borrowers (like the
priceof oil and other commodities, the real interest rate in the U.S.,
the growth rate of industrialized nations, etc.).
3/ One of the first attempts to use such contingencies was the
rescheduling plan between the IMF and Mexico in the summer of 1986, in
which the future supply of credit was made conditional on the price of
oil.— 19—
anapplication of our model, in which we analyze the nature of country
risk in the presence of equity finance. The present analysis will
demonstrate that swapping nominal debt with equities may have useful
consequences for reducing country risk, but it cannot eliminate the
fundamental problems associated with international credit.
Itis usefulto start with the case of a one sector economy (q=l),
wherefor notational simplicity we suppress the aectorial index.
Consider an initial equilibrium in our economy with an initial level of
indebtedness of B. A debt -equityswap will replace the debt B with
claimsonan 'equivalent' fraction of the value added. We denote that
fraction by T. Adefault in the equity scheme will occur if its
benefits (in the form of no payments to foreigninvestors)exceed the
defaultpenalty. Thus, a default will occur if and only if
t(1—) X > XP, where the left-hand side stands for the foreign
equity income paid in case of no default, and the right—hand side stands
forthe default penalty. Consequently, the condition assuring no
default is that the foreign ownership share Tdoesnot exceed
Pm/Cl —). Thiscondition is useful in yielding the maximum equity
investment in period one, which is determined by the expected net
present value of the foreign equity income extracted for
=m"
-) whichcan be approximated by C(K)a -
Thisdefines the equivalent of a 'credit ceiling' for the case of equity
investment. It is given by a portion m'(t'f) of the expected
output. It can be shown that a useful property of the equity scheme is
that it increases the correlation between the income of foreign
Investors and the default penalty, thereby reducing the inoidence of— 20—
default.In our example, for equity investment below the ceiling
defined above we obtain no default because the equity scheme leads to a
unitary correlation between the default penalty andtheincome to
foreign owners. It can be also shown that the switch from debt to
equity finance has the consequence of increasing the credit ceiling
facing the economy. Furthermore, as long as the foreign investment is
below the ceiling, an equity scheme will increase the optimal
investment. 1/
Ourdiscussionshould be viewed only as an example for the benefits
of the debt—equity swap. Because we allow the random shock to affect
output and the default penalty in the same way we obtain the strong
result that equity finance will eliminate defaults up to the credit
ceiling. This is done by correlating the repayments with the default
penalty. The debt—equity swap, however, is not able to eliminate the
impact of country risk and the resulting need to impose a ceiling on the
available credit. Instead, it allows us to increase the credit
ceiling. It is noteworthy that in the presence of several shocks which
affect output and the default penalty in different ways, the move to
equity finance will not eliminate incidences of default but it may be
beneficial to the degree that it increases the correlation between the
default penalty and the repayment. It can be shown that the general
optimal contract in the presence of country risk is not an equity
finance but rather a loan contract that optimally indexes the repayment
1/Formally,the optimal capital stock with equity investment is
givenby equation (7),forthe case where we replace m with 0 (assuming
that we operate below the credit ceiling).— 21—
tothe default penalty, and the credit ceiling subject to such a
contract is the expected net present value of the penalty (discounted at
the risk free interest rate). 1/
V.Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this study is to draw attention to the linkages
between country risk and the openness of an economy, and to demonstrate
that in the long run the openness of an economy is endogenously
determined by the interaction between endowments and policies. The
presence of country risk poses a problem f or the smooth operation of
international credit markets: the ex—ante first best policy is for
countries to pre—commit themselves to no—default policies. Such a
commitment, however, may not be credible because it may not be the
optimal ex—post policy. This suggests a special role for policies
leading towards investment in openness —asa way to increase the
credibility of a no—default commitment.
1/ For further discussion of the optimal contract in the presence of
country risk and equity finance see Aizenman (1987).— 22— AppendixA
The purpose of the Appendix is to summarize the derivation of the
results reported in the paper. We start by formulating the problem as a
welfare maximization of the representative agent and the central bank.
We then derive the optimal credit market and investment policies.
Suppose that the utility of the representative agent is given by




where 5 stands for the subjective rate of time preference and C. is the
consumption of traded goods at time t (t =1,2). We allow for
domestic policies in the form of a borrowing tax andlump—sum
transfers. The domestic interest rate for consumption borrowing, r, is
defined by
(A2) r =r*(1 +p)
(A3) r1 =r*(1 +p)
where r* is the interest rate facing the country and PC is the domestic
tax on consumption borrowing. Similarly, r1 is the interest rate for
investment borrowing in sector i, defined by p. The budget constraints
facing the representative agent are
(A'4) Ci=Yi+Bc- 23— AppendixA
q
(A5) C =Y +R—B(1+r )—. I.(1+r.) 2,n 2,n c c 1=11 1
(A6) C2d =2,d
where subscripts n and d correspond to the cases of no default and
default,respectively; and R is a lump—sum transfer(to be specified
later).The aggregate investment borrowing and consumption borrowing
(B) is obtained as the sum of Be and I across all the individual
borrowers. Equations (A5) and (A6) are the budget constraintsf or
periodtwo for the cases ofno default and default, respectively.
Domesticagents are assumed to be small enough to be price takers in the
domestic credit market. Each faces a given interest rate.
The agent's problem is to allocate consumption and investment so as
tomaximize his expected utility subject to the budget constraint. Let
V denote the value of the expected utility of a representative
consumer. It follows that
(A7) V =u(C1) +J00 u(C2d)d +6J U(C2n)d
Theagent chooses investment I and indebtedness B so as to maximize his
expected utility, (A7). Because each agent is a price taker in the
credit market, is viewed by the consumer as given. Solving the
optimal consumption and investment plan for a representative agent








where MU(Ct) stands for the marginal utility of consumption in period t
Ct =1,2),MPK21 stands for the marginal product of capital in period
two in activity i, and E{YIN.D.} stands for the expected value of a
variable Y conditional on no default (i.e. conditional on 'P > 'Y0). 1/
Equation (A8) represents two types of intertemporal arbitrage
conditions. The first concerns the equality of the marginal utility of
consumptionat period one to the discounted expected marginal utility
of future consumption (conditional on no default) times the interest
rate. This is the condition under which the benefit of increasing first
periodconsumption by borrowing equals the future costs associated with
repayment. 2/ Thesecond arbitrage condition Iswithregard to optimal
investmentborrowing: the expected cost of borrowing (in terms of second
period expected marginal utility) should be equated with the expected
marginalutility of investment. This is the condition under which the
1/ Formally, E{MU(C2)JN.D.}=6
f0U'(C2,n) d'' and E{MU(C2) MPK2,1)
=6f°Ut(C2,d)(3Y22,i)d'P ÷6f0U'(C2,n)( 2"2,i
d'P.
2/ Note that sincerepayment occurs only instates of no default, the
expectationoperator in (A8 a) is conditional onno default.- 25- AppendixA
benefit of increasing the investment by borrowing equals the cost
associated with repayment.
To gain insight into the potential role of optimal policies let us
evaluate the solution of the optimal consumption path by a centralized
decision maker. Potential deviations between the planner's and the
consumer's solutions will justify policies to support optimality. These
policies will be shown to be in the form of optimal borrowing taxes. We
assumethat the lump-sum transfer R is used to rebate to consumers the
proceeds generated by the borrowing taxes. 1/ The planner's problem is
to choose consumption borrowing (Be) and investment borrowing that
will maximize the welfare of the representative consumer. A key
differencebetween the consumer's and the planner's problems is that the
centralized planner is not a price taker in the credit market, and he is
aware that the choice of borrowing will have an impact on the interest
rate via the supply of credit. Consequently, (AT) implies that the
condition for optimal borrowing and investment from the planner's
perspective is
a. MTJ(C1) =tS E{MU(C2)N.D.}(1+r*)(1 ÷dlog (1 +r*))
(A8')
b. E{MU(C2)IN.D.I (1 +r*)(1+d
)= E{MU(C2)MPK2.}
1/ Note that this implies that the lump—sum transfer to the consumer
q
is r*[p0Bc + pI1]. Consequently, the budget constraint that is
relevant for the policy maker in the absence of default is
(A5) C2
= — + I}(1+r*)— 26- AppendixA
for i =1,..,q.
A comparison between the planner's and the consumer's solutions
reveals that the two differ in that the planner applies the social
interest rate, whereas the consumer applies the private one. The social
interest rate is defined as the total marginal interest cost associated
with the borrowing for consumption and f or investment activities, given
by:
(A9) (1 +r*)(1+dlog (1+r*)) and (1 +r*)(1+dlog (1÷r*))
respectively. Note that the social planner face different social
interest rates f or the various activities. The key difference between
the individual agent and the social planner is that the latter is
internalizing the marginal changes in the interest rate facing the
economy due to marginal borrowing. These changes in turn are determined
by the use of these funds, and are reflected in the second term in the
social interest rates. The percentage difference between the private
and the social interest rates equals the elasticity of the interest
rate (1 +r*)with respect to the borrowing, which in turn define the
optimal taxes, as reported in (3) —('I).
We turn nowto an overview of the derivation of the equations
reported inSection III. Short—run profit maximization with respect to







1j• Thus,a raise of Pm from 1 to exp Pm
associated with a change of output at a rate of:
(All) exp (—i1i)m)
—i—{i/(l_8i)}Pm•
Note that a portion .ofoutput is spent on the imported input. Thus,
the value added is =(1—.)X.,and (All) implies that the drop in
value added in sector i resulting from the default is
—i)Xn,i/(1 i)}Pm =iXniPmAggregating the drop In the value
added across sectors gives us equation (6) in the text.
We turn now to the derivation of the value of A1 that is applied in
(I). Applying (6) and the definition of the marginal value of the
productivity shock that is associated with default ()weget that
is the solution to
2
(A12) (1 +r*)B =p.E .c.{ o jl/(l—.)(K.) cz/(l-1)
m
Note that A1 =3log 11/3 log K1. Recalling that 11 f(') d'i' we
0
obtain by logarithmic derivation that
3 log
(A13) A1 = 3log K.





where s is the i's sector share in the aggregate penalty at the
marginal default (i.e., 'P =
= 1
where the X's are obtained by (AlO) evaluated at
1 n;1 2 n;2
'P = and =1.Applying similar derivation we get also that





Applying(A15) and (A114) to (A13) yields that A1 =secLI(l—81),which
the result applied in the text to derive (4').
We turn now to the derivation of (7). Equation (AlO) implies that









where cJ ={cu'(1—8.)}c..Denoting by ij'thevalue of log ('Y) we obtain
that







Optimal investment is made so as to yield equality between the expected
cost (1 ÷rf)and the expected marginal product of capital. Note that
for small shocks we can approximate exp {(IP —Pm8i)/'(l—8)}— 29— AppendixA
by1 +(ij — p8.)/(l—s.). Applyingthis approximation we obtain that
theexpected marginal product of capital is









Theoptimal stock of capital is obtained by solving the K that equates
(A18) to 1 +rf,yielding (7) in the text.— 30—
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